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Systemic Risk Assessment in Complex Supply
Networks
Anna Ledwoch, Alexandra Brintrup, Jo¨rn Mehnen, Ashutosh Tiwari
Abstract—The growth in size and complexity of supply chains
has led to compounded risk exposure, which is hard to measure
with existing risk management approaches. In this study, we
apply the concept of systemic risk to show that centrality metrics
can be used for complex supply network risk assessment. We
review and select metrics, and set up an exemplary case applied
to the material flow and contractual networks of Honda Acura.
In the exemplary case study, geographical risk information is
incorporated to selected systemic risk assessment metrics and
results are compared to assessment without risk indicators in
order to draw conclusions on how additional information can
enhance systemic risk assessment in supply networks. Katz
centrality is used to measure the node’s risk spread using the
World Risk Index. Authority and hub centralities are applied
to measure the link risk spread using distances between ge-
ographical locations. Closeness is used to measure speed of
disruption spread. Betweenness centrality is used to identify
high risk middlemen. Our results indicate that these metrics are
successful in identifying vulnerabilities in network structure even
in simplified cases, which risk practitioners can use to extend with
historical data to gain more accurate insights into systemic risk
exposure.
Index Terms—Complex supply networks, systemic risk, net-




supply chain can be defined as a set of companies that
share the production and delivery responsibility of the
material flow, from raw materials to the finished product de-
livered to end-users [1]. Supply chains spontaneously change
and emerge without a single entity controlling it, thus they can
be considered a Complex Adaptive System (CAS) [2]. During
recent decades supply chains became global and intertwined,
increasing their complexity and risk exposure.
Globalisation resulted in increased competition, which lead
to pressure to decrease costs through practices such as reduc-
ing inventory or supplier base, outsourcing, factories tend to
focus on core capabilities [3]–[9]. Global sourcing encouraged
manufacturing in sites in few places in the world, which made
companies vulnerable to disruptions like natural disasters and
terrorism [3]. Risk assessment has thus become an important
part of successful supply chain management [8], [10], [11].
Several risk assessment practices exist, but none of these
embody the structural complexities supply chains face today.
Although the term complexity has many definitions, in this
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context it shall denote that a structure has numerous inter-
connected components with non-trivial interactions [12], [13].
Recent empirical studies show that supply chains comprise of
inter-tier connections, cycles and feedback loops [14], [15],
thus can be represented as a network rather than a chain [16].
Interconnectedness, complexity and uncertainty have increased
[4], [8], [11], [17] and so did risk exposure [11], [18], [19].
Supply chains became extended networks, they became
susceptible to disruptions cascading through complex inter-
actions and interdependencies. This implies that their risks
have systemic nature [20]. Increased risk exposure necessitates
extended supply network visibility, where the term extended
refers to the visibility beyond direct business partners. Supply
network visibility is often limited or unavailable [21]–[25].
Current tools do not always consider the extended supply
network and are not enough to capture vulnerabilities [26],
[21]. There is a need for better methods to identify and
measure risks [11], [27], including supply chain dynamics,
flows and interdependencies [26].
This research aims at identifying new methods for systemic
risk assessment in supply networks. We argue that network
theory is a suitable tool for systemic risk evaluation, when
risk practitioners do not have an access to detailed supply
chain data. First, we review the concept of systemic risk and
recent advances in the domain of supply chain risk assessment.
Next, we give an overview of statistical tools available in the
interdisciplinary field of network theory to assess their appli-
cability for systemic risk assessment. We split the metrics in
three groups: degree-like, closeness-like and betweenness-like.
We choose amongst them ones that are a good representation
of the others, based on the correlation study. Five metrics are
chosen to be applied in the case study: eigenvector centrality,
hub, authority, closeness and betweenness. Katz centrality (a
type of eigenvector centrality) is used to evaluate transmission
of the node risk; hub and authority centralities are applied
to measure how the risk associated with links transmits to
nodes; closeness is used to assess speed of disruption spread;
betweenness centrality is used to identify the high risk firms
amongst the intermediaries. We highlight how these metrics
can be used through a case study that assesses the risk of
firms embedded in the Honda-Acura supply network and how
incorporating supply network specific information to centrality
measures can enhance systemic risk view.
II. RELATED WORK
Risk is the probability of a negative event occurring mul-
tiplied by the impact of this event [28]; or the variability of
possible outcomes [29].
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As risk in supply chains increase, risk assessment practices
gain more popularity. Example of risk assessment methods are
conceptual frameworks [30], [31]. However these are usually
subjective and time-consuming. Other methods include risk
optimization and evaluation. Roncoli et al. (2013) developed
a model for risk minimization for transport of dangerous goods
by road [32]. Raj et. al. (2015) developed a model measuring
resilience using Cox-PH model [33]. These approaches are
usually NP-hard [34], and become computationally expensive
as extended supply networks can reach to thousands of nodes
and tens of thousands of links [24].
Traditional risk practices were developed for supply chains
having in mind their hierarchical properties and simplicity. The
growth in their complexity, interconnectedness and interdepen-
dency made old techniques outdated [35], [36]. Traditional risk
concepts are being replaced by the idea of systemic risk, a risk
on the systems level.
According to Helbing (2013), systemic risk is “the risk of
having not just statistically independent failures, but inter-
dependent, so-called ‘cascading’ failures in a network of N
interconnected system components” [35]. While thinking about
systemic risk one needs to ask questions such as: who is most
likely to fail? How will it affect other parts of the system?
Who is most likely to fail next?
An intuitive way to measure systemic risk in a complex
system is through the use of simulation. Examples include
measurement of the disruption impact in the Portuguese au-
tomotive industry [37] or risk assessment using timed Petri
nets [38]. The main drawback of such approaches is that
simulations are data driven. In cases where supply network
visibility is limited data might not be easy to obtain. There
is a need for methods that enable the assessment of risk of a
complex system, without the need of long and laborious data
collection.
The interdisciplinary field of complex networks focuses on
the identification and study of patterns that occur in complex
networks such as social, computer, technological or brain net-
works. Complexity science helps to analyze risk propagation
with the use of methods like cascading failures, percolation
or epidemiology. It has begun with the field of social sciences
and biology, where phenomena such as information cascades,
diffusion of innovations or spread of diseases are studied. In
these systems an individual in a society is able to influence
other’s behavior, decisions and beliefs [39], [40] or health [41].
Systemic risk has been seen from the lens of cascading
failure, which happens when a disruption in one node triggers
failures in neighboring nodes [42]-[44], applied across range
of fields such as transportation networks [45], power-grids [42]
or supply networks [43], [44]. It was observed that cascades in
many systems happen rarely, yet with surprising high impact
[46]. There are various cascade propagation models available
in the literature and each of which deal with different damage
scenarios taking into account the same initial conditions [47].
Another view on systemic risk in complex systems can
be taken from epidemiology, a science of understanding risk
spread in networks. It has been applied to many disciplines
ranging from transmission of infectious diseases in biologi-
cal systems, power-grid failures or computer viruses spread.
Epidemiology studies how network topology influences prop-
agation of a disease and answers the question what is the
possibility of an outbreak in the system [48]. It expanded
its view from disease spread to systemic risk profiles, espe-
cially in financial networks studying unexpected shocks and
bankruptcy propagation [49], [50]. In supply networks Hertzel
et al. (2008) studied the effects of firm bankruptcy [51] and
Basole and Bellamy (2014) used classical epidemic model to
measure risk diffusion [21].
Another network science method is percolation, which is the
process of removing some part of the network: nodes, links or
both [52], to determine network robustness and resilience [48],
but can be successfully applied as a systemic risk proxy. It has
been used in numerous applications including communication
networks [53] and supply chains, where Thadakamalla et al.
(2004) and Zhao et al. (2012) applied the classical preferential
attachment model to generate a supply network, and used
percolation for supply network survivability and resilience
assessments. Their work highlights that different topologies
result in different network vulnerabilities - for example scale-
free network structures are robust against random attacks, but
vulnerable against targeted ones [34], [54].
So far we have mentioned dynamical processes used for
risk assessment, but the domain of complex science is also
wealthy in static methods originating from graph theory.
Examples of such metrics include shortest paths [55]–[57],
degree distribution [58], [59] or clustering coefficient [59]. In
supply networks Reniers et al. (2012) have studied systemic
risk of the chemical industry, by developing the risk indexes
based on the shortest path metric [60].
Percolation, cascading failures and epidemiology are tools
that help detecting vulnerabilities in the network and they have
been extensively applied in many domains, including supply
networks. But so far they have been used mainly to assess the
overall system health. The focus of this paper is to investigate
how an individual node in the complex system is exposed
to systemic risk and how its vulnerability is affected by its
direct and indirect neighbors, which requires more in-depth
analysis on the node level. Based on this gap, we will draw
from the field of Social Network Analysis (SNA), which is
a sub field in complex networks rich with statistical tools
specifically, centrality metrics, that enable the assessment of
topological properties of a network from an individual node
perspective. Centrality measures explain the nodes that play a
significant role in the general structure of a given network [61],
[48]. In addition, there are various types of interpretations for
centralities such as power, exposure, risk, control, autonomy or
other [62]. Centralities has been used for vulnerability and risk
assessment in various fields, ranging from electrical grids and
financial systems to supply networks. Wang et al. (2010) have
used centrality measures such as degree, eigenvector centrality,
betweenness and closeness to assess the vulnerability of the
electric power grid [63].
Systemic risk assessment has become popular in financial
systems mainly after the 2008 financial crisis [64]–[66]. Hu
et al. (2012) built a framework that incorporates individual
bank level information with hub and authority centralities in
order to predict contagious bank failures and determine capital
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injections to stop those failures [64].
In supply networks the focus has been on identification of
critical business partners [8], [15], [67], [68]. Bezuidenhout
et al. (2012) used degree centrality in the cause-and-effect
network to identify critical issues in the sugar cane supply
network [15]. Mizgier et al. (2013) used radiality, betweenness
and degree centrality as an aid in bottleneck identification [8].
Basole and Bellamy (2014b) used betweenness centrality as a
risk measure in their visualisation framework [68].
Network perspective is a powerful way to systematically
understand the complex supply network dependencies and
flows [21], especially when detailed data are not available.
We found that many network approaches focus on the overall
system health, ignoring what is the vulnerability of a node
embedded in a complex supply network. Centrality measures
can help to assess the compounding of risks residing in various
parts of topology to create a systemic view [34], but have
found limited application in supply networks [8], [15], [67],
[68]. Literature highlights its potential in risk assessment and
the need for further study [8], [15]. In the following sections
we first review node-level network theory metrics drawing
from various fields to assess whether they can serve as a useful
systemic risk proxy. We then illustrate how chosen centrality
measures can be used by applying them in an empirically
informed case study, whereby geographical risk is incorporated
to the network. We conclude by discussing how additional
insights can be gained and outline future opportunities for
research.
III. SYSTEMIC RISK ASSESSMENT BASED ON
CENTRALITY MEASURES
Network theory is the study of networks. A network is a
combination of nodes and links, where nodes represent entities
of the system and links their relationships. In the supply
chain context nodes can represent companies or geographical
locations whereas links can represent contractual relationships
or material flow. There are different networks types such as:
undirected, directed and weighted. Directed networks imply
that there is a direction of the relationship between nodes. For
example, this could be used when there is a need to represent
a material flow from a supplier to a customer. Weighted
networks are used when the links or nodes themselves can
be characterized by some value, such as inventory or goods
transferred.
A. Node-level metrics overview
This section consists of an overview of node-level metrics
with their applicability for supply chain systemic risk assess-
ment, based on the relevant literature. To define centrality
metrics we use adjacency matrix with the following definition:
Aij =
{
1 if there is an edge from j to i
0 otherwise.
(1)
1) Degree centrality: The degree of a node it is the number
of nodes connected to it [48]. It depicts the connectivity and
immediate chance for a node to exert its influence to the rest
of the network [63]. In the literature the degree is associated
also with prestige, status [48] or access to knowledge [69]. It





where A is an adjacency matrix, and CDi is a degree
centrality of a node i.
The measure has been applied in vulnerability assessment
in various domains from power-grids, disease networks to
supply chains. Wang et al. (2010) uses degree with the domain
related information to find the vulnerable nodes in power-grid
network [63]. Bell et al. (1999) uses the metric to assess the
vulnerability of individuals defining it is a probability of being
infected by HIV [70]. Laxe et al. (2012) links degree with the
operational capacity of each port in transportation network
[58]. Correa and Yusta (2013) use the measure to define the
operational functionality of the power grid components, e.g.
low-degree nodes are capacitors, high-degree are buses [55].
Borgatti and Everett (2006) relate to the degree centrality as
the volume measure and discuss that it is associated with
certainty of arrival [62]. There are many applications for this
centrality measure and it has a fair background in vulnerability
assessment [71], being a good indicator of the exposure of the
node to whatever is flowing through the network [63], [72].
In a supply chain context degree specifies the number of
business partners. It has been used to identify specific roles
of firms within the supply network: integrators and alloca-
tors. An integrator is a company assembling or transforming
materials into value-added products, whereas an allocator’s
responsibility is resource distribution [73]. It has been used
by Bezuidenhout et al. (2012) and Mizgier et al. (2013) for
bottleneck identification [15], [8], and by Dong (2006) to
assess supply chain robustness [67].
Although a useful measure to assess the vulnerability, we
argue that it is not enough to assess the systemic risk. Mizgier
et al. (2013) mention that it accounts only partially for network
topology [8]. Niu et al. (2015) mentions that the degree
consider limited information and there are better metrics that
include the global information [74].
2) Eigenvector centrality: Eigenvector centrality measures
node importance based on the importance of its neighbors [75].









where A is an adjacency matrix, CEIi is eigenvector cen-
trality of the node i and κ1 is the largest eigenvalue of the
adjacency matrix.
High eigenvector centrality means that a node has more
power [72], [74]. Borgatti and Everett (2006) relate eigenvec-
tor centrality with certainty of arrival and highlight the link
with risk assessment [62]. It was used in pattern analysis in
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fMRI data of the human brain [76] and applied to electric
power grid for vulnerability analysis [63].
In a supply chain context it might be regarded as a measure
of how important a focal company is, based on the importance
of its business partners. The node or link characteristics can
be substituted by the risk factor, which enables the assessment
of how local risk influence risk of company’s neighbors.
Examples of such risk factors are natural disaster index,
terrorism index, or inventory risks.
3) Hub and Authority Centrality: Hubs are nodes that point
to many authorities. Authorities are nodes that are pointed to









where α and β are positive constants, A is an adjacency
matrix, CA is authority centrality and CH is hub centrality.
Hub and authority centrality has been used in financial sys-
tems to identify which banks need a capital injection in order
to stop contagious failures [64]. Carlos (2013) argues that
authority and hub centralities are successful proxies to measure
systemic risk and are able to identify different systemic risk
types: coming from the out-going and in-coming links [78].
In a supply chain context this measure can be interpreted
as a metric identifying firms having many customers or firms
having many suppliers, either direct or indirect. Different
weights associated with the links and nodes can be applied
such as volume, any cost or lead time variance for links, and
natural disaster index, inventory risks for nodes. Weights could
help identify companies that have many supplier or customer
relationships with firms having high local risk.
4) Closeness centrality: Closeness centrality is the inverse
of the mean distance from a node to other nodes [48],






where CC is closeness centrality, n is number of nodes and
dij is length of the shortest path between nodes i and j [48].
Closeness centrality indicates how long it takes for infor-
mation to spread from the node to the rest of the network
[74], is associated with the influence on other nodes [72]
and independence [69]. It is regarded as a proxy for social
capital and information spread [80], [81]. Closeness centrality-
like measures are natural choice when dealing with risk of
something arriving on time [62]. Closeness is used by Nguyen
et al. (2013) for the vulnerability analysis in the electric power
network [82].
The highest closeness value for a company embedded in the
supply chain indicates that the firm has the smallest average
distance to the other parts of the network. Companies with
high centrality have been classified as navigators, who collect
information more autonomously [73].
5) Radiality centrality: Radiality centrality is a measure of
how a node is connected and reachable within a network [83],




d− dij + 1
n− 1
(7)
where d is the network diameter, dij is the length of the
shortest path between nodes i and j, and n is the number of
nodes.
In a supply chain context it denotes how closely the com-
pany is located to its partners in the neighborhood. It is a
natural choice when dealing with risk of something arriving
on time [62]. Mizgier et al. (2013) used radiality to identify
suppliers that if disrupted affect the most companies [8]. The
measure can be used with weights such as lead time, or
distance.
6) Betweenness centrality: Betweenness centrality mea-
sures the extent to which a node lies on paths between other







where stj,k(i) indicates number of shortest paths between
j and k going through i and stj,k number of all shortest paths
between j and k.
Betweenness centrality is associated with the global im-
portance of the node and the influence it has over the flow
in the network [71], [74] including spread [72] and cut-off
of information [69]. Bompard et al. (2011) argue that the
higher the betweenness, the higher number of geodesic paths
coming though the node and therefore higher criticality [85].
Laxe et al. (2012) link betweenness centrality with relative
geographical importance [58]. Nguyen et al. (2013) use the
metric for vulnerability assessment in power networks [82];
Tang (2013) for IP multimedia subsystems [59].
Betweenness centrality in a supply chain context might
indicate companies that act as a middleman, important in
passing a product from a supplier to a customer. Those
companies are intermediaries, controlling the flow of goods
[73]. Mizgier et al. (2013) used it to identify bottlenecks
in the supply network [8]; Basole and Bellamy (2014) used
betweenness in risk visualisation model [68]. The metric can
be used with supply related information, such as material flow
volume or cost variance, which can help in identifying the sites
in the network lying on the paths with highest fluctuations.
B. Summary
Metrics that are suitable for systemic risk assessment are
eigenvector centrality, authority, hub, closeness, radiality and
betweenness centrality. Summary of related work in supply
chains and other fields is presented in Table I. Borgatti and
Everett (2006) mention that these metrics complement each
other and are needed for creating a complete picture of various
roles played by each node in the network [62].
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TABLE I
APPLICATIONS OF CENTRALITY MEASURES IN SYSTEMIC RISK
ASSESSMENT
Measure Supply network Other fields
Degree [8], [15], [67] [55], [58], [59], [63], [69],
[70], [71], [72], [82]
Eigenvector centr. [63], [72]
Hub and authority [64]
Closeness [55], [63], [69], [72], [82]
Radiality [8]
Betweenness [8], [68] [58], [59], [63], [69], [71],
[72], [82], [85]
TABLE II
PEARSON COEFFICIENT CALCULATED FOR THE CENTRALITY VALUES FOR
MATERIAL NETWORK OF HONDA ACURA
CEI CH CA CC CR CBT
CD 0.93 0.00 0.95 0.83 0.65 0.98
CEI - 0.31 0.84 0.96 0.86 0.89
CH - -0.17 0.50 0.69 -0.05
CA - 0.72 0.52 0.95
CC - 0.96 0.81
CR - 0.61
Shaded cells are used to indicate the correlation that has passed the t-test
at 99.95% confidence interval
IV. CASE STUDY
In this section we use the material flow and contractual
relationship supply networks of Honda Acura presented by
Choi and Hong (2002) and used by Kim et al. (2011) as a
case example to illustrate how systemic risk concepts could
be applied to supply networks [14], [73]. A correlation study
is carried out to identify centrality measures that might carry
similar information. From those we will select metrics that can
be used to illustrate how systemic risk can be measured.
A. Correlation
After the calculation of each metric reviewed in Section
III, Pearson correlation coefficient and the significance t-
test at 99.95% confidence interval of each coefficient pair is
performed (Table II). Pairs of centralities in Table II that have
high correlation and have passed the t-test are shaded.
Three categories of metrics emerge: degree-like measures,
closeness-like measures and betweenness-like measures [62].
Degree-like measures consist of degree centrality, eigen-
vector centrality, hub and authority centralities. Closeness-
like measures consist of closeness centrality and radiality.
Betweenness-like measures family consists of betweenness
centrality. We analyze the correlation of those measures within
the group and decide which metrics will be applied for the case
study of Honda Acura.
Degree centrality is not considered in the case study, be-
cause it accounts for network topology only partially [8], [74].
Since eigenvector centrality and authority centralities are not
correlated with hub centrality, we consider all three for the
case study. Closeness and radiality are highly correlated with
each other, thus we choose one to apply in Honda Acura
network. Closeness centrality is chosen since it has numerous
applications in the risk assessment literature. One needs to bear
in mind that the results of the correlation study is specific to
the network of Honda Acura - as different supply networks
might bear different topological features the resulting metrics
might have different correlations.
B. Experiment description
We perform two experiments for each metric for unweighted
and weighted network to highlight how incorporating domain
related information can enhance risk analysis. To measure
systemic risk we use two different risk types: node risk and
link risk. As a node risk we apply World Risk Index (WRI),
as a link risk we use a distance between two geographical
locations. We assign the WRI to nodes in the study of Katz
centrality (a type of eigenvector centrality), to identify risk
spread in the undirected contractual supply network. We assign
the distance between geographical locations to links in the
study of hub and authority to assess supplier and customer
risk exposure in the directed material network, and in the
study of closeness to assess the speed of disruption spread
in the undirected material network. The inverse of distance is
used for betweenness centrality study to identify the critical
intermediaries. There are in total 8 experiments and their
summary is presented in Table III.
WRI and distance are not part of the original Choi and Hong
(2002) case study, thus the Marklines1 automotive database is
used to extract companies headquarters locations, which helps
to evaluate node and link weights. The care has been taken
to be as accurate as possible, although due to the fact that
the data provided in the study of Choi and Hong (2002) is not
the most recent, we made some assumptions. Therefore values
retrieved from the on-line database and geographical locations
found should be taken as guidance only, not the actual state
of the current Honda Acura supply chain.
Data are incomplete as names of five companies are changed
in order to protect the identity of the firms: Intek, JFC, J1,
J2, and J3. For those cases Intek and JFC are assumed to be
suppliers located in China, as Marklines suggests. Choi and
Hong (2002) highlights that J1, J2 and J3 are suppliers located
in Japan, but we were unable to find additional information in
Marklines database, thus we assume that the headquarters are
located in Tokyo.
Calculations were performed using NetworkX library for
Python 3.4.
C. Katz centrality for assessing undirected node risk spread
Katz centrality is applied to the contractual network of
Honda Acura to assess undirected node risk spread. It is a









AijCKj + βi (9)
where CKi is Katz centrality of a node i, A is the adjacency
matrix of the network, κ1 is the biggest eigenvalue of the
adjacency matrix and βi is the constant. We use Katz, since
original eigenvector centrality does not account for including
1http://www.marklines.com/en/supplier db/, accessed on August 2015
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TABLE III
CASE STUDY EXPERIMENT SUMMARY
Direction Weights
Experiment Measure Network type Undirected Directed Unweighted Node weight Link weight
1 Katz centrality Contractual x x
2 Katz centrality Contractual x x
3 Hub and authority Material flow x x
4 Hub and authority Material flow x x
5 Closeness Material flow x x
6 Closeness Material flow x x
7 Betweenness Material flow x x
8 Betweenness Material flow x x
TABLE IV
KATZ CENTRALITY FOR CONTRACTUAL NETWORK OF HONDA ACURA
Unweighted Node-weighted
Company CK Company CK
Intek 0.3759 Intek 0.3302
Honda 0.3113 Iwata Bolt 0.2948
Arkay 0.2377 Microtech 0.2528
Select Ind. 0.2169 Nihon 0.2528
Tobutsu 0.1873 Honda 0.2515
HFI 0.1741 J1, J3 0.2493
node characteristics and Katz does [48]. We substitute βi by
1 for unweighted case and by WRI for weighted case to
incorporate geo-political risk.
The WRI is an index that measures risk on the natural haz-
ard and social level. It consists of four components: exposure,
susceptibility, coping and adaptation. Exposure is a natural
disaster risk, susceptibility is a likelihood of suffering harm,
coping is a capacity to reduce negative consequences, and
adaptation is a capacity for long-term strategies for societal
change, as defined by [87]. The index is appointed per country
and is the highest for Vanuatu (36.43), and the lowest for
Qatar (0.1). The ranking consists of 173 countries with 7.40
as the average. WRI is assigned to each node according
to their headquarters location taken from on-line automotive
database Marklines. The metric is calculated for unweighted
and WRI node-weighted case. Table IV presents results for
the six highest Katz centralities in the contractual relationship
network.
In the unweighted case, the highest Katz is for Intek and
Honda. This is because they manage most of the business
relationships in the supply network. Intek can be regarded as
the most critical company, because it has the highest number of
business partners and its partners have numerous relationships
themselves. Katz centrality score of other companies is also
proportional to their degree.
In the node-weighted case, the highest Katz centrality has
Intek. The second score belongs to Iwata Bolt because together
with its two business partners they are located in high risk
region, creating a high risk cluster. The other companies that
have high Katz centrality are Intek’s business partners with
high local WRI.
Traditional unweighted Katz centrality evaluates the risk
of the node based mainly on its degree and degree of its
neighbors. Incorporating additional information, such as WRI,
enables to identify firms vulnerable to geo-political risk that
TABLE V
HUB CENTRALITY FOR MATERIAL FLOW NETWORK OF HONDA ACURA
Unweighted Link-weighted
Company CH Company CH
Iwata Bolt 0.0617 Select Ind. 0.0988
Select Ind. 0.0575 Tobutsu 0.0980
Tobutsu 0.0575 IPG 0.0591
Milliken 0.0544 Milliken 0.0609
Arkay 0.0544 Honda Trading 0.0583
Garden State 0.0544 Jergens 0.0580
TABLE VI
AUTHORITY CENTRALITY FOR MATERIAL FLOW NETWORK OF HONDA
ACURA
Unweighted Link-weighted
Company CA Company CA
Intek 0.6656 Intek 0.5830
Arkay 0.1589 Arkay 0.3359
HFI 0.1153 HFI 0.0465
Select Ind. 0.0602 Select Ind. 0.0345
Honda Trading 0.0000* Honda Trading 0.0001
Iwata Bolt 0.0000* Honda 0.0000*
* approximation
would not be identified using the traditional approach. Iwata
Bolt, Microtech, Nihon, J1 and J3 are firms having relatively
small degree compared with the other companies, thus are
omitted by unweighted Katz centrality measure. High WRI
and the proximity to other high geo-political risk exposure
locations makes them worth attention for risk practitioner. For
network visualisations please see Figures 1a and 1b.
As presented above, Katz centrality can be used with local
risk factors to identify high risk firms clustered together.
This shows how local risks impact those of its neighbors, to
generate the systemic view.
D. Hub and authority centrality for assessing directed link
spread
Hub and authority centralities can be used to assess the
directed link spread of failure. Directed network of material
flow of Honda Acura is used for this example. Two cases are
considered: unweighted and weighted with transportation risk
assigned to the links. We calculate transportation risk based
on the distance - the higher distance the higher risk. Results
for both cases are presented in Table V and VI.
Nodes with high authority and hub centrality can be re-
garded as the ones having high risk suppliers and high risk




Fig. 1. Network visualisations: a) unweighted Katz centrality, b) node-weighted Katz centrality, c) unweighted hub centrality, d) link-weighted hub centrality,
e) unweighted authority centrality, f) link-weighted authority centrality. Each node and link are sized and shaded according to the respective centrality value.
The darker and bigger node/link, the higher value.
customers respectively. Unweighted hub centralities are low,
because there is no dominant hub in the network and the
ones having the highest score are the ones with the highest
out-degree and having Intek as a customer. Intek has the
highest authority because it has many suppliers and is the last
assembler before delivering to Honda.
For the link-weighted case, high hub values have companies
that are supplying directly to Intek and have higher number
of high transportation risk relationships with other customers.
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Fig. 2. Network visualisations: a) unweighted closeness, b) link-weighted closeness, c) unweighted betweenness centrality, d) link-weighted betweenness
centrality. Each node and link are sized and shaded according to the respective centrality value or link weight. The darker and bigger node/link, the higher
value.
The companies with the highest authority are the ones having
the highest number of high transportation risk supplier links.
Unweighted hub identifies companies mainly according to
their out-degree: the higher number of customers, the higher
risk. Weighted hub centrality assigns the highest risk to compa-
nies having high out-degree and having high risk relationships
with their customers. Tobutsu and Select Ind. are important for
product assembly with many high risks supplier relationships,
but their criticality for Honda operations is not highlighted
enough by the unweighted hub centrality. Weighted and un-
weighted authority result in the same companies identified as
the ones having high risk. This is because in order to be an
authority a node cannot have zero in-degree. There are only
few nodes that fulfil this condition, thus there are not many
nodes that can have high authority. For network visualisations
please see Figures 1c, 1e, 1d and 1f.
Hub and authority centralities can be used for assessing
the systemic risk in the supply network. The authorities
are vulnerable to disruptions from supplier side, hubs are
vulnerable to disruptions from customer side.
E. Closeness for assessing the speed of disruption across a
network
We use closeness to calculate the speed of failure spread
across the network. The assumption that it is a good measure
for speed of risk spread is based on the fact that it measures
the topological proximity of a node to the rest of the network.
The closer the node to the rest of the network, the higher the
probability that it will affect the network quicker. Topological
proximity is of course a single factor in the spread of risk. For
example, delivery frequencies, lead times between suppliers,
and the volume of delivery would all have mediating affects on
topological proximity. Since operational variables frequently
change, and are often invisible to extended members of the
network, topological proximity to the source of a disruption
could serve as a preliminary indicator of how soon a company
could be impacted. Metric is used for undirected material flow
network of Honda Acura. Two different cases are applied:
unweighted and weighted with the distance as a link weight.
Table VII presents the results for both cases. In order to find
the most vulnerable companies in the network, we look at the
highest closeness.
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TABLE VII
CLOSENESS CENTRALITY FOR UNDIRECTED MATERIAL FLOW NETWORK
OF HONDA ACURA
Unweighted Link-weighted
Company Closeness Company Closeness
Intek 1.0000 Intek 1.0000
Arkay 0.7419 JFC 0.9433
Select Ind. 0.7077 Iwata Bolt 0.8747
Iwata Bolt 0.6970 J1 0.8747
Tobutsu 0.6479 J3 0.8747
Honda Trading 0.6389 Harmony 0.8312
Intek, Arkay, Select Ind., Iwata Bolt, Tobutsu, and Honda
Trading have the highest unweighted closeness. These compa-
nies are located at the heart of Honda Acura operations and
are the most involved in the product assembly.
In the link-weighted case, the highest centralities have
the following companies: Intek, JFC, Iwata Bolt, J1, J3 and
Harmony. Other companies with high score, but not included
in the tables are Nihon, Lipro, Topy and Microtech. This is
because all the companies mentioned are located in Asia with
Intek being the main assembler. The close localization means
that if a disruption happens in any of these companies, its
effect might be transferred quicker through Intek to the rest of
the supply network. For network visualisations of unweighted
and weighted closeness centralities please see Figure 2a and
2b.
JFC, J1, J3 and Harmony are not identified as critical by
the traditional unweighted closeness, because the proximity of
those companies to Intek is not considered in unweighted case.
This means that incorporating distance related information
enables to identify high risk clusters of nodes close to each
other.
F. Betweenness centrality for the identification of high risk
intermediaries
We use betweenness centrality for the identification of
high transportation risk intermediaries. We apply the centrality
measure to undirected material flow network for Honda Acura.
There are two cases: unweighted and weighted. We set the
inverse of the distance as the link weight and we assume that
the higher the distance, the higher probability of something
going wrong during transportation. The inverse is used because
betweenness centrality is based on the idea of counting how
many times the node lies on the shortest path between all the
other nodes. Since we are interested in the nodes lying on the
high risk paths, we inverse the risk, because the shortest path
with inversed risk is equivalent to the highest risk path. Results
for betweenness centrality are presented in the Table VIII and
Figures 2c and 2d.
The companies with the highest betweenness centrality for
unweighed and weighted cases are Intek and Arkay. This is
because they are located at the heart of this supply network
operations, managing multiple relationships. Select Ind. has
higher centrality in the weighted case, because it is managing
more business relationships with high risk than the other nodes
identified as critical. Originally there are few nodes having
non-zero betweenness not included in the Table VIII as Garden
TABLE VIII
BETWEENNESS CENTRALITY FOR IDENTIFICATION OF HIGH RISK
LOCATIONS
Unweighted Link-weighted
Company CBT Company CBT
Intek 0.8387 Intek 0.8390
Arkay 0.1869 Arkay 0.2538
Honda Trading 0.1761 Select Ind. 0.2386
Select Ind. 0.1414 Honda Trading 0.1761
Iwata Bolt 0.1193 Iwata Bolt 0.1193
Tobutsu, WPC 0.0606 Tobutsu, WPC 0.0606
State, HFI and Miliken. Their betweenness reduces to zero
for weighted network, on the account of Select Ind. World
Class Plastics gets high betweenness, but does not score high
in experiments performed with other centrality metrics. It is
because it has low degree and is located relatively far way on
the average from the other nodes in the network. Still it is
topologically important firm, as it plays an important role for
C&C as a material delivery proxy.
Betweenness centrality applied with the transportation risk
indicators can be used to identify nodes that lie on the highest
transportation risk paths. These nodes are critical for the
supply chain operations, because they often behave as a proxy,
enabling communication and goods transportation between
two ends of the supply network. Incorporating supply chain
domain information enables to highlight the most critical firms
amongst the intermediaries, although in the Honda Acura case
did not bring many additional insights.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
Alternative supply chain risk management frameworks are
gaining attention in the post-financial crisis era. Cost re-
duction strategies such as outsourcing, offshoring, inventory
minimization and supply base can result in increased risk
exposure [18], [26]. Companies extend their supply chain
boundaries globally, often leading to a lack of understanding
on how risk is compounded at the system level. While cost
reduction strategies will continue to prevail, new methods
for assessing and planning for compounded risk need to be
developed. Those methods should have in mind the invisibility
of operational variables for the extended members of the
network. In this paper we contribute to the extant literature by
arguing that the new science of networks makes this possible.
Our contributions are as follows:
• We interpret centrality metrics in the supply chain risk
context, building on the literature from the other fields.
Eigenvector centrality, hub and authority centrality, close-
ness centrality, radiality and betweenness centrality can
be used for supply chain systemic risk assessment to
evaluate how local risk of either the relationship or the
business partner can spread across the network. Amongst
those metrics we have chosen the ones that lead to
complimentary considerations of risk:
– Katz centrality can be used to calculate systemic risk
for a site taking into account the local risks of neigh-
boring business partners.
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– Hub centrality can be used to identify the sites that
have high-risk customer relationships.
– Authority centrality can be used to identify sites that
have high-risk supply relationships.
– Weighted closeness can be used to identify the compa-
nies that if disrupted will make the cascading failure
to progress the quickest.
– Weighted betweenness centrality can be used to iden-
tify the highest risk companies amongst intermediaries.
• We devised methods to analytically incorporate risk ex-
posure into the centrality metrics, showing that additional
information enhances assessment of systemic risk in
supply chains and in doing so, it delivers helpful decision
support. As an example of risk exposure information that
can be added this way, we have chosen geographical risk
indicators to identify clusters of companies that operate
in areas with high geo-political or transportation risk. The
insights can help risk practitioners in supply chain design
and choice of their supply base.
• We compare centrality measures with and without their
risk exposure embedded versions and concluded that
incorporating additional information can enhance risk
assessment. Although centrality measures are common
in the literature, their risk embedded versions are absent
to the best of authors knowledge. Pure metrics consider
only number of business partners, e.g. authority centrality
identifies sites with high number of suppliers, which
have high number of suppliers themselves etc. But this
information might not bring many insights about actual
risk. We might have 20 suppliers, but if all of them are
stable local suppliers, our risk will be smaller than if we
had 5 very high risk and unstable ones. Incorporating risk
exposure in the supply network helps to see additional
information beyond topology only and is a useful tool
for decision support where access to operational data is
limited.
In using the above metrics for systemic risk assessment, the
risk practitioner needs to define weights on nodes and links,
where link weights can refer to risk related to the relationship
between firms, and node weights can refer to the local risk
of the company. In this study we have used geo-political risk
and transportation risk as examples, but other risk exposures
can be used by risk practitioner e.g. quality issues, reputation
risks etc.
Future avenues for research include increased granularity
and heterogeneity on node and link risk, through the com-
pounding of different risk factors such as machine breakdowns,
hazards, combined time delays, and production defects. Fur-
ther analysis need to be made on increased network size and
the applicability of different risk planning strategies in light
of different vulnerabilities.
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